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Notes and Discussions
Hegel on Reference and Knowledge
Hegel claimed that the object of thought is the universal. Since knowledge involves
thought, this seems to imply that knowledge of particulars, or what Hegel called
individuals, is impossible. But careful distinctions must be made before this interpretation of Hegel can be endorsed. I would like to look more closely at an argument
commonly supposed to support this thesis and show that what is really at issue is the
immediacy of our knowledge of individuals, i.e., whether we have any knowledge of
individuals that is not mediated by universals. In this argument Hegel denies only that
we have any immediate knowledge of individuals. How a denial of the possibility of
knowledge of individuals must be interpreted in Hegel's system will be discussed
briefly in the final sections of this paper, when the role of reference in knowledge is
explored more fully. While the discussion here will focus on such linguistic items as
names and demonstratives, there are crucial philosophical questions about the nature
of meaning and knowledge which hang in the balance.
The argument of Hegel's with which I am primarily concerned occurs in the first
chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, 1 "Sense-Certainty." Sense-certainty is the attitude
that takes true knowledge to be the immediate presence of an object to consciousness,
eschewing all categorization. But, Hegel replies, any attempt to express one's knowledge involves categories, even the use of such apparently non-categorial words as 'this',
'here', and 'now'. Since knowledge must be expressed if it is to be preserved or communicated, expressibility is a necessary condition of knowledge, for we could hardly call
something knowledge that could neither be remembered nor communicated. Such a
categorially impoverished word as 'this' expresses the poorest, rather than the richest
and truest, form of cognition. However rich the sensuous manifold may be, it does not
itself constitute any kind of knowledge.
The above is but a rough sketch, but my first concern here is with why a certain
interpretation and kind of reply to this argument will not work. We can find this
interpretation and reply in at least four places in the contemporary literature. a D. W.
1 References to Hegel's texts have been abbreviated in the body of this paper. The following
editions were used: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), abbreviated as PhS, and Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 6th ed. (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1952), abbreviated as PhG. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1969), abbreviated as SL; Wissenschaft der Logik, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: F.
Meiner, 1934), Vol. 2, abbreviated as WdL .
• D. W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception: A Histury of the Philosophy of Perception (New York:
Humanities Press, 1961), 140-46; Ivan Soli, An Introduction to Hegel'sMetaphysics (Chicago: Univer-
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Hamlyn's statement of this interpretation is the earliest of these and is quite lucid. He
takes the point of the argument to be that because demonstratives are universals, we
cannot use them to refer to particulars, and because they do not successfully refer to
particulars, knowledge phrased in terms of them cannot be knowledge of a particular.
He then replies to the argument that such demonstratives, and proper names as well,
for that matter, do indeed refer, and thus there is no problem about knowledge of
particulars.
Words like 'red' are normally applied to many things predicatively; we use such
words to characterize things. We do not normally use 'this' in that way, but in order
to refer to things. The fact that we use the word 'this' to refer to a number of
different things on different occasions does not show that it is like 'red' in its use.
Words like 'this' were fastened on by Hegelians for the same reason as they were
fastened on by their later opponents--e.g., Russell-heeause they were supposed to
be the last ditch in a defence of knowledge of particulars. If these words did not
guarantee particularity, what would? But the considerations which make it implausible to treat these words as general words of the same kind as 'red' apply equally to all
those words which we use to refer to particular things, e.g., proper names. If we
have, therefore, the means of referring to particulars, there seems no remaining
objection to the view that we may have knowledge of particulars also.5
This interpretation of the argument is simply wrong: in the first section of this paper I
show that Hegel does not deny that we can successfully refer to particulars, whether
with names or with demonstratives. After discussing the relevant similarities and differences between names and demonstratives from Hegel's point of view, I shall discuss
how Hegel's notion of the role of singular referential devices within knowledge is most
plausibly construed. For this last part of the paper, contrasts wi~h Russell's theory of
acquaintance will be most illuminating, for we can understand Hegel's argument in the
"Sense-Certainty" chapter as an attempt to destroy the belief that there can be knowledge of particulars by acquaintance.
Hegel's arguments that all knowledge of individuals must be mediated by universals are independent of his own proprietary and rather peculiar conception of a concrete universal. Every cognitive state involves relation to some universal, whether
abstract or concrete; only the adequacy and richness. of the cognitive state depend
upon whether the universal is abstract or concrete. I shall therefore make no particular
mention of the abstractness or concreteness of the universals involved in our cognitive
states.

1.
Hegel does not deny that such terms as 'this' and 'here', or proper names, for that
matter, can and often do successfully refer to individuals. The crucial question posed

sity of Chicago Press, 1969),91-110; Gilbert Plumer, "Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference," SouthwestemJournal
of Philosophy (1980): 71-94; M. J. Inwood, Hegel (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1983),311-17.
s Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, 1411-43.
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by Hegel in the "Sense-Certainty" chapter of the Phenomenology is "whether in sensecertainty itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that sense-certainty proclaims it
to be; whether this notion of it as the essence corresponds to the way it is present in
sense-certainty" (PhS, 59; PhG, 81). The question is not, then, what theobject is, or
what predicates it takes, but whether it is the kind of object sense-certainty can get a
grip on. The attitude of sense-certainty presupposes a certain view of the nature of
objects and a view of the nature of the knowledge relationship that reveals the object to
the knower. What fuels the dialectic here is the discrepancy between what sensecertainty believes knowing an object is and what sense-certainty can actually achieve.
But it is clear upon reading the rest of Hegel's argument that he never denies our
ability to refer, but rather counts on our ability to refer to get his argument off the
~und.
If we ask "What is now?" we may (given that it is that time of day) correctly
answer "Now is night." Hegel at no time denies the correctness of the reference here.
Someone unfamiliar with Hegelian terminology might be tempted to think that he
does deny this, for he immediately proceeds to question the troth of this assertion. But
truth and correctness are not the same for Hegel. 4 Questions of truth are questions
about the agreement of something with its essence, the extent to which it lives up to its
ideal. Sense-certainty believes that the here and now is the sole truth, the essence of
objective experience. But, Hegel claims, "a truth cannot lose anything through our
preserving it" (PhS, 60; PhG, 81). Ifwe take sense-certainty seriously, we find that "The
Now that is Night is preseroed, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as something
that is; but it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is not." For we have
looked at the preserved assertion in the cold light of day. "The Now does indeed
preserve itself, but as something that is not night" (PhS, 60; PhG, 81). In other words, in
each case the assertion successfully refers; in one case what it says is incorrect. Correctness is at least a necessary condition of truth, so the statement does not express something true. No single moment is the essence of the now, and the now is not the essence of
any objective experience.
Hegel's mode of expression, as usual, is not overly transparent; but the basic point
seems to me to be this: Their singularity, their very here-and-nowness, is what sensecertainty takes to be crucial to the objects of our experience, and correlatively, it takes
knowledge to be direct presence or acquaintance. But this is a totally inadequate notion
of what the essence of an object of our experience is, for if the object were exhausted
by its presence to us, it would not. be distinct from the experience of it. The object of
experience goes beyond experience. Sense-certainty's inadequacy is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the most appropriate expression of immediate experience does
not pick out the same object twice; it is impossible for sense-certainty to identify objects
across experiences. Thus it is crucial to Hegel's arguments that 'this' can successfully
refer now to a tree, now to a house, for it is precisely the inconstancy of the object it
picks out that shows that 'this' is not an adequate expression for the essence of the
objects of experience.

4

Soil seems not to notice the correctness/truth

distinction in his rebuttal to Hegel's argument.
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We may put the point a slightly different way, I believe. The words 'this', 'here',
'now', etc., all demonstratives, do have meaning, however abstractor difficult to formulate exactly. And this meaning remains constant throughout all the uses of the terms.
However, these terms play the role of non-characterizing, context-dependent, referring expressions. Thus, their actual reference is determined not just by their meaning,
but also by the context of their use. Anything at all is a possible referent of 'this'; thus,
in knowing something to be a 'this' one knows nothing at all about it. One gets beyond
the uninformative 'this' only in the predicate of the judgment or in the contextual
presuppositions of the act of referring.

2.

That this is Hegel's view receives support from the fact that he makes a similar argument about proper names. In considering ajudgment like "God is the eternal," Hegel
asserts "In a proposition of this kind one begins with the word 'God'. This by itself is a
meaningless sound, a mere name; it is only the predicate that says what God is, gives
Him content and meaning. Only in the end of the proposition does the empty beginning become actual knowledge" (Preface, PhS, 12-13; PhG, 22). Any internally unstructured, pure referring expressions, such as proper names or demonstratives, areuninformative and empty according to Hegel.!;
This position is not immediately evident, for it can be easily claimed that no isolated
expression is informative. A predicate, such as 'red' or 'eternal', does not itself inform
us of anything until it finds a position in a proposition; it seems to be no different from
a pure referring expression in this regard. But this is going too far, for predicates are
the predicates they are because of the relations they bear to other predicates. These
relations include exclusion (e.g., between red and green), inclusion (e.g., between
bachelor and man), and presupposition.
It is important to remember here that according to Hegel concepts are essentially
the kind of thing 'that can play the role of a middle term in a syllogism. And what is
essential about this role is the ability to unify the universal and the individual, represented by the major and minor terms. But syllogisms (or more generally, inferences)
are explanatory devices we use to increase or communicate our understanding. We can
develop a measure of relative 'cognitive content' for concepts, given Hegel's theory: a
concept with little cognitive content will play a small role in only a few explanatory
syllogisms; a concept with a great number of conceptual connections to other concepts

5

Richard Aquila, in his excellent article, "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics," Kant Studien

64 (1973): 231-45, argues convincingly that besides this epistemological problem with mere
referring expressions, Hegel also takes there to be a fundamental metaphysical problemnamely, when taken seriously, the idea of a pure referring expression seems to commit us to the
idea of a pure referent, what we now call a bare particular. Hegel takes bare particulars to be
nonsensical. The epistemological and metaphysical dimensions of referring expressions can be
kept separate for our purpose, though.
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will play an important role in a number of illuminating explanatory inferences. Concepts, but not names, have cognitive content.6
Names are not similarly embedded within a complex web of inferential relationships, or to the extent that they are, they lose the character of a pure referring expression and begin to have the conceptual content characteristic of predicates. There has
been a long debate over whether proper names have senses or not, but what John
Searle has called the "classical" account insists that they do not.? There are problems
generated by such a position, but it seems clear that Hegel agrees with Mill in accepting
a version of this "classical" theory of proper names. The lack of a sense is, at least in
part, due to the fact that a name is not embedded in a network of conceptual relations
in the way predicates are. Arguments to the effect that proper names do have senses
often depend upon the fact that certain names do indeed acquire some, perhaps illdefined, "conceptual" relations with some predicate terms.s Proper names are bestowed totally arbitrarily (at least as far as a logician is concerned); in order to be given
a certain name there are no criteria the object must satisfy, whereas in order for a
certain predicate to be applied, there are (often highly complex) criteria that must be
satisfied. Again, names, unlike descriptions, do not tell us how to individuate the
objects referred to, except insofar as there are certain conventions about reserving
certain (kinds of) names for certain kinds of objects: "language, as the work of the
understanding, says only what is universal, except for the name of an individual object;
the individual name, however, is something meaningless [Sinnloses] in the sense that it
doesn't express a universal and appears as something simply posited, arbitrary, for the
same reason that proper names [Einzelnamen] can be arbitrarily assumed, given or even
changed" (WdL I: 104-5, my trans.; SL, 117).
Thus, names do not have cognitive content according to Hegel; only predicates
have such content.9

~

6 A notion of 'cognitive content' is helpful not only in understanding Hegel's theory of the
role of reference, but also in understanding what he is getting at when he demands that philosophers question the general truth of their categories. Untrue predicates are those with minimal
conceptual content, that is, they are relatively unimportant in explaining and understanding the
world. Thus, genus concepts tend to be truer than merely accidental predicates, and the concept
of the concept, as the concept crucial to the understanding of the world, is the Truth, the Idea.
7 Some (e.g., Linsky) think that this position originated with Mill,but here Hegel antedates
him. This position has recently received powerful new support from Kripke, Putnam, and others.
SeeJohn Stuart Mill,A System of Logic (NewYork: Harper and Brothers, 1850),20-27 (Vol. 1, Bk.
1, Chap. 2, ~5); John Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Paul Edwards, (New York: Macmillan, 1967),6:487-91; Leonard Linsky, Names and
Descriptions (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1977),7; Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity,"
in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1972);Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," The Journal of Philosophy 70 (November
8,1973): 699-711.
8 Thus 'Aristotle' may not be equivalent to any specificset of descriptions, but if someone were
to tell us that Aristotle neither studied under Plato, nor wrote the Metaphysics, nor engaged in
biologicalresearch, nor founded the Lyceum ... we might not believethat he wasindeed talking
about the Aristotle we know and love.
9 The exegetical problems are actually thornier than I have painted them here. In the
discussionsof language in the Encyclopedia ~~459-64 Hegel treats all non-logicalwords as names. It
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3·

It would now be convenient to assert that not only are names lacking in cognitive
content, but so are demonstratives. But this would clearly do Hegel injustice. Hegel
claims that demonstratives are universals; he does not claim that names are. Rather,
demonstratives are a limit case of cognitive content, in that they have as little as
possible.
Definite descriptions seem clearly to have some cognitive content: they characterize
the object, allowing one to make certain inferences about the object based on the
characterization. Most definite descriptions require relativization to a context in order
to sort out the reference made. Demonstratives are similarly, though more obviously,
context dependent. In a pure demonstrative reference seemingly all characterization
of the object has dropped away, and it is the context alone (with perhaps help from a
gesture) that supposedly suffices to fix the reference. But that context will specify
certain characteristics that the demonstrated object should have, just as the predicates
in the definite description did.
Descriptive reference is mediated by universals, by predicates. Hegel's position is
that demonstrative reference is in the same boat: it is not different in kind from
descriptive reference. Thus, we can grant Hamlyn that 'this' is not a predicate and yet
maintain that it does have something of the universal about it.
Note the similarities demonstratives have with singular descriptive phrases:
1. In both, a change in context can easily produce a change in reference. 'The
tallest man in the room' will refer to different people in different rooms, and, if the
occupants of a room change, it may easily acquire a new reference in the same room.
Here the reference depends upon the satisfaction of certain criteria, and the thing that
satisfies the criteria is referred to, whatever it is. This is not the case for names-at least
given a Millian theory of names. 'This', 'here', and 'now' also change reference as the
context changes. Again this is a matter of the satisfaction of certain criteria (e.g.,
saliency in the environment), but these criteria are often so minimal that it is difficult
for them not to be satisfied. How a demonstrative refers is more similar to how a
description refers than to how a name refers.
2. Descriptive reference invokes a conceptual scheme allowing one to make certain
inferences about the object. 'The tallest man in the room' allows one to make infer-

seems evident that, whether or not it was his considered view, he was strongly tempted by a 'twoname' theory of judgment. Here he again shows affinities to Mill. Furthermore, in common with
other exponents of the "new way of ideas," Hegel took such words to name ideas (or as he called
them, representations; see ~~459 and 461). Yet he distinguishes the names available i~ a language
from the "formal factor in language," which is the "work of the understanding" and "gives rise to
what is grammatical" (~459). Actually this theory of names may have saved Hegel from the
difficulties that a two-name theory of judgment must otherwise fall into. Hegel recognizes that
grammatical structure makes a very important contribution beyond anything that the vocabulary
itself can provide. This allows him to treat subjects and predicates, even if both are names, as
differently as their grammatical roles. Cf. P. T. Geach, "History of the Corruptions of Logic,"
LogU Matters,

44-61.
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ences about the genetic make-up of the object talked about, its approximate spatial
location, and, if we allow what can be inferred with some probability, we can conclude a
great deal more. The doctrine of meaningless names will allow no inferences on the
basis of a name alone. Certain demonstratives, however, do carry with them license to
make some inferences. 'Now' indicates that what is being referred to is a time; 'here'
indicates that a place or area is being referred to. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the
inferences one can make on the basis of demonstrative reference alone are very minimal; this supports the thesis that they have only minimal cognitive content.
3. The definite description rubric, 'the
', requires completion with some
predicate expression. The demonstrative rubric 'this
' admits such completion. But it does not make sense to talk of completing a name.
4. A point which Hegel seems not to have noticed, but which adds extra support, is
that both definite descriptions and (some) demonstratives can have plural forms (e.g.,
'the men in the elevator' and 'these') but names cannot. 10
Much of what I have said about demonstratives, however, can also be applied to
proper names, for they too shift reference from context to context. 'John Smith' names
many different people, and which person is in fact picked out in a specific utterance
depends upon contextual factors. Names also tend to offer clues to some characteristics
of the referent: 'John Smith' will most likely name a human male in any of its
occurences, 'Rover' a dog, etc. Still, though there are conventions correlating certain
names with certain kinds of objects, these conventions are much looser and without the
normative force of conventions governing predicates and demonstratives. It is difficult
to state exactly what the differences between names and other expressions comes down
to, but it is clear what Hegel recognized such a difference.
The difference between names and demonstratives might be summed up as follows: Names are too determinate in their mode of reference to characterize what they
refer to; pure names tell us nothing about the object, because all they do is refer to it.
Demonstratives, on the other hand, are too indeterminate to characterize the object of
reference in a conceptually useful way; they tell us nothing about the object other than
where to start looking for it." Names and demonstratives are at opposite ends of a
spectrum: names can refer to one and only one thing, but demonstratives can refer to
anything at all. Yet neither has significant cognitive content, neither gives any kind of
intrinsic characterization of the object.

4·
I have shown that Hegel does not deny that we can refer to particulars. Knowledge of
particulars depends upon the ability to refer to them, for we certainly could not know

10 We do say things like 'There were three Rockefellers at the concert'. Such pluralizations
are either equivalent to statements of the form 'There were so many things called
" or
depend upon the names being doled out in accordance with certain non-linguistic criteria, thus
removing them from the category of pure Millian names in which we are interested.
11 The context probably provides us with a sortal that tells us what sort of thing we are
looking for. But this is presupposed, not said.
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of something that we could not even refer to. Many thinkers have been seduced into
believing that different modes of reference are correlated with different modes of
epistemological access. The advantage of such a position is that the theory of meaning
and the theory of knowledge then exhibit elegant and important parallels.
This raises the question of whether Hegel assumed there to be a correlation between modes of reference and modes of epistemological access. A comparison with
Russell will be instructive, for there is much to be learned from the late, lamented
Lord, if only from the error of his ways. Between 1905 and 1913 (or later) Russell
never shook the idea that for non-logical terms meaning was, in the last analysis,
reference. For our sentences to be meaningful they had to consist ultimately of (1)
logical words, which determined the logical form of the sentence, and (2) non-logical
words, which successfully referred either to particulars or universals, depending on
the word. In order to know a truth, Russell argued that we must first have knowledge of
the components of the truth. Thus, in order to make our knowledge of truths intelligible, there had to be a form of knowledge prior to any knowledge of truths. Knowledge
by acquaintance fills just this role. Just as the meaningfulness of a sentence is guaranteed by the fact that all its non-logical words denote (and that it is well-formed, of
course), our knowledge of a truth presupposes knowledge of the constituents of the
judgment, a different and immediate form of knowledge. II
That universals are things with which we can be directly acquainted is no longer a
very popular view. Hegel too would reject the reification of universals, for it is an
almost too perfect exemplification of the approach he insists is common to all "philosophies of the understanding." The meaning of a predicate is not some thing-like universal that it names.'S In contrast to Russell, Hegel took predicate terms to be verbs, not
covert names. If one holds such a theory of universals, there is no need and no use for
the idea of acquaintance with a universal in order to understand this part of our
knowledge of truths.'4 Indeed, since predicates do not refer, a correlation between
reference and epistemological access will not explain the cognitive role of predicates.
What role do names and demonstratives play in knowledge? In the Russellian

u Russell often talks as ifthe very things with which we are acquainted are constituents of the
judgment, to which should be contrasted Hegel's insistence that we cannot say the thing itself. See
Russell's Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), chapters 3, 4, and 12;
"On Denoting" in Logic and Knowledge edited by Robert C. Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956)
55-56.
'5 Actually, as I have already pointed out, for Hegel the 'meaning' of a predicate word is a
'universal' that it 'names'-namely,
the thought in the mind of the speaker. The thought's meaningfulness is not itself derived from the fact that it names some universal which leads a thing-like
mode of existence in some nebulous Platonic heaven. Furthermore, Hegel insists that thought is
primarily an activity, thinking. Having a certain thought is thinking a certain way. The verbal
nature of the universal is retained.
'4 Our knowledge of universals is ultimately like an agent's knowledge of what he is doing,
which is not at all like acquaintance. See my paper "Hegel on Thought and Representation,"
ldealistu Studies 17 (May 1987):123-32; also Charles Taylor, "Hegel and the Philosophy of Action," Hegel's Philosophy of Action, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (Atlantic Highlands, N.].: Humanities Press, 1983).
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paradigm-and
here many people still agree with him-singular reference guarantees
that our knowledge really does hook up with the world. Russell was convinced that
there had to be some place where the hookup was unbreakable in order for knowledge
to be possible. In acquaintance knowledge is directly and immediately related to the
world. Russell believed that the only logically proper names were demonstratives referring to the objects of direct acquaintance: sense-data, memories, the self, and universals.
How Hegel would reply to Russell should now be clear: direct acquaintance is not
necessary to guarantee that knowledge hooks up with the spatio-temporal world. Demonstrative reference is not reference unmediated by universals; its basic form is that
of a description, yet its conditions for success are so meager that it does guarantee a
sufficient hookup with the natural world.'5 To think of demonstratives as names is
simply to misconstrue them.
But, according to Hegel, names do playa role in connecting our thoughts with the
world. Yet, the reference relation is not itself cognitive, and names themselves contain
no information. Having a name in mind is evidence of knowledge of an object only if it
can be used to make true judgments about the object. Russell had not fully learned that
words are primarily components of judgments and gain meaning only within a judgment. Instead, he insisted on looking for an independent and self-subsistent meaning
and epistemological significance for all non-logical constituents of a proposition. But
the fundamental sort of knowledge is knowledge of truths (in Russell's sense), and any ,
knowledge of things is (consists in) a knowledge of truths about these things. Any other,
more direct relation we may have to the thing is not a cognitive relation.
5·

To present a full picture of the role in knowledge that Hegel assigns to singular
referential devices, I must point out one further thesis Hegel accepted: In true knowledge, no reference to any individual occurs. This is a sense in which it is true that Hegel
denies that there is knowledge of individuals. But this is true only of the very highest
form of knowledge, absolute knowledge. This form of knowledge is experienced inchoately in Art and Religion and achieved explicitly only in Philosophy, when we understand the world, as it were, from a "God's-eye point of view." To see why absolute
knowledge makes no mention of individuals, we must explore the connection between
reference and the realm of the finite, for it turns out that reference by individuals to
other individuals is an artifact of the finite.
I will first argue that the highest form of knowledge, absolute knowledge, cannot,
according to Hegel, contain any reference to individuals per se; I will then return to my
main point and show why it is the case that the phenomenon of individual reference in
human language is nonetheless indispensable.
Like most of his predecessors, Hegel believed that there are different degrees of
'5 Although David Kaplan would probably not find the present treatment of demonstratives
in the least congenial, he offers an interesting argument along similar lines that knowledge by
acquaintance is not needed to insure reference (Demonstratives, unpub. ms.).
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being. Furthermore, Hegel and others (among them Plato) held that there are degrees
of knowledge corresponding to the degrees of being. Hegel held that the form of all
knowledge is judgmental. He believed further that judgmental forms are capable of a
hierarchical ranking based on the adequacy of the forms to the expression of the truth,
that is, based on the adequacy of the forms to the articulation of the world.
Hegel also distinguished between judgments proper (Urteile) and propositions
(Satze), though the distinction is not clear.'6 The most important thing about propositions (in Hegel's sense) is that they are essentially concerned only with a particular state
of affairs and contain minimal theoretical baggage. Hegel says a proposition "contains
a determination of the subject which doesn't stand in the relation of universality to the
subject-some state or individual action or such; 'Caesar was born in Rome in such and
such a year, waged war for 10 years in Gaul, crossed the Rubicon', etc. are propositions,
not judgments."'? However, when a proposition is "asserted on the strength of some
reason or other," it would "partake of the nature of a judgment."'8 For in that case the
particular facts are treated as universals: reason is always generic. The "relation of
universality" that holds between the concepts within a judgment is a rational connection, such as to be expressed by or stand behind a rational inference.
This distinction is, I believe, parallel with the truth/correctness distinction mentioned earlier. Propositions are merely capable of correctness, judgments of truth.
True knowledge-knowledge
of the highest order-is
knowledge of Truth (with a
capital T), and therefore judgmental, not merely propositional in nature.
The ultimate upshot of Hegel's doctrines is that true knowledge is the pursuit of
philosophy. Philosophical truths are unconditionally necessary and universal. Like the
conditionally necessary and universal truths of empirical science, philosophical truths
contain no reference to any particular-unless
it be the "universal particular," the
Absolute-and
the true philosophical comprehension of the Absolute would never
make essential use of direct singular reference to the Absolute.
Names and demonstratives do playa role in the cognitive, however. P. F. Strawson
has argued that such devices are necessary elements of any empirically learnable and
usable language.'9 Oddly enough, Hegel would agree. The emphasis here, though, is
on empirical. Reference is essential to the knowledge that finite beings have of the finite
world, and since finite beings come to knowledge of the infinite through knowledge of
the finite, reference is a necessary presupposition of all their knowledge.
In the Hegelian system the finite is that which is determinate through its contrast
with other things external to it or separate from it. Thus, the finite comes in individualized chunks. Now the chunks are not, and couLd not be, mere individuals, bare particulars, but must exemplify universals. Names are the linguistic counterparts of individu.6 Cf. The Logic of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892);
Enzyklopedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, eds. F. Nicolin and O. Poggeler (Hamburg: F.
Meiner, 1959), ~167. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969),
626; WissenschaftderLogik,
ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1934),2: 267.
'7 Encyclopedia, ~167 .
•8 Science of Logic, 626.
'9 "Singular Terms, Ontology, and Identity," Mind 65: 260 (October 1956): 451.
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als; it is as impossible to have a language that consists solely of names as it is to have a
world consisting of bare particulars."o
If names are the linguistic expressions of individuality per se, demonstrative reference is the linguistic counterpart of the essential contrastive relativity of individuals.
This is perhaps a bit harder to see. Hegel takes the fact that finite things gain their
identity within contrastive relationships to external things to indicate that finite things
are "self-external," that is, that they are not totally self-determined in their nature and
existence. Demonstrative reference is founded upon the fact that the user of the term
is one thing in a context of many others. Whereas an everywhere, everywhen divinity
(which, of course, could not be the Hegelian Absolute) could use names to refer to
individuals, it could not sensibly use demonstratives. Demonstrative reference brings
out the individuality of the knower as well as the known.
Reference is the necessary condition for locating or applying universals to individuals, and is thus a necessary condition for knowledge of the finite. Although no particulars would be referred to in absolute knowledge, an absolute knower must be able to
use and understand singular references, for without such an understanding there
could be no knowledge of the finite. And since in Hegel's view the finite is contained
within the infinite, and not merely set over against it, a being without knowledge of the
nature of the finite could not be said to have full knowledge of either the infinite or the
Absolute."
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00. This should not be taken to preclude
the possibility of a Sellarsian Jumblese, for that
consists of configured names, not just names .
•• The vague ideas which generated this paper jelled during a most helpful discussion with
Lynn R. Baker, to whom I am very grateful. I have further profited from comments by my
colleague, W. E. Kennick, from Sidney Shoemaker, Gilbert Plumer, and from colloquia audiences
at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the Pacific Division of the APA, where my
helpful commentator was G. J. Mattey.

